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A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COLORADO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT:
"ACCIDENTS," "INJURIES" AND HEART ATTACK
by MORTON GITELMAN,* JAMES BILLINGERJ and ROBERT PATTERSONT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963 the Colorado Legislature added a new section to the
Workmen's Compensation Act, providing legislative definitions of
two key terms in the act - "accident" and "injury." The new
section provides:
Definitions. (1) The term "accident" as used in this
chapter shall mean and include one or more determinate
act or acts of a traumatic nature, which caused an injury.
(2) The term "injury" or "injuries" as used in this chap-
ter shall mean and include only trauma to the physical
structure of the body and such disease or infection as nat-
urally results therefrom. The terms shall not be construed
to include disability or death due to natural causes occur--
ring while the employee is at work.'
Many observers feel that the new amendment was intended
primarily to restrict the possibility of compensation awards in heart
attack cases.2 An analysis of heart attack compensation cases in
Colorado (Part II of this paper), and of the statutory changes in
light of similar provisions in other states (Part III), indicates that
the new statute may not change the compensability of heart attacks,
but instead may drastically affect the outcome of cases concededly
compensable before enactment.
Tn order to appreciate the effect of the new amendment on
he-it attack cases, we must necessarily examine the sometimes
tortuous Colorado compensation cases attempting to bring the heart
attack within the statutory condition for recovery "that the injury
or death [be] .. .proximately caused by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment .... I
II. COMPENSATION FOR HEART ATTACK IN COLORADO
A. Causation
If a heart attack could not be an injury within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, it could never be compensable.
That simple solution, initially chosen by the Industrial Commission,
was rejected by the Supreme Court of Colorado, which said: "By
the term 'injury' is meant, not only an injury the means or cause
of which is an accident, but also any injury which is itself an acci-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver.
t Member of the Colorado Bar.
T Member of the Colorado Bar.
1 CoLO. REv. STAT., § 81-2-9, Colo. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 180, §1.
2 Interview with James H. Murphy, Referee of the Colorado Industrial Com-
mission, December, 1963.
A CoLo. REV. STAT. § 81-13-2 (1953).
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dent.- 4 .The court added that there is an accident if the "result was
unexpected and unintended," and necessarily implied that whether
there was an accident is a question of law, and that the Industrial
Commission's answer to such question is not binding upon the
courts of review.
5
This first consideration by the Supreme Court of Colorado of
the compensability of a heart attack involved the question of
whether the injury was caused by an accident, but not whether the
accident, if there was one, "arose out of" the employment. In the
landmark case of Ellerman v. Industrial Comm'n,6 the Commission
ruled that "overexertion," without the presence of an externally
produced blow or strain, or abnormal working conditions, as had
been present in the Carroll case, could not be an "accident." The
supreme court came to the rescue of the bereaved claimants, hold-
ing that if there were a heart attack due to overexertion, and if
that overexertion had arisen out of the employment, and if the
attack would not have occurred "save for such employment, then
the 'overexertion' was an 'accident.' -7
Attempting to supply some guidelines for the resolution of
future heart attack cases, the court went on to provide that whether
there was an accident was a question of law, while whether the
overexertion had arisen out of the employment (causation) was
a question of fact, to be determined by the Commission. Further-
more, by remanding the case to the Commission for a determination
of whether there had been overexertion arising out of the employ-
ment, the court logically implied that whether there was overexer-
tion was a question of fact.
The Ellerman case marked the court's first mention of over-
exertion in discussing compensability of a heart attack. Although
it did not there specifically make overexertion a requirement for
an award of compensation, it did so subsequently.8 Because of the
court's many determinations of whether there was overexertion in
heart attack cases, both prior to its specific requirement of over-
exertion9 and after it,10 there can be no doubt that Colorado follows
4 Carroll v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 475, 195 Pac. 1097, 1098 (1921).
5 Ibid.
6 73 Colo. 20, 213 Pac. 120 (1923).
7 Id. at 22, 213 Pac. at 121.
8 Industrial Comm'n v. International Minerals and Chem. Corp., 132 Colo.
256, 287 P.2d 275 (1955).
9 Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d 296
(1951); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 122 Colo.
31, 219 P.2d 315 (1950); Black Forest Fox Ranch, Inc. v. Garrett, 110
Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (1943) ; Coors Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, 109 Colo.
39, 121 P.2d 669 (1942); Industrial Comm'n v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104
P.2d 458 (1940); Wood v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Colo. 209, 66 P.2d 806
(1937); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571,
45 P.2d 895 (1935); Ellerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Colo. 20, 213 Pac.
120 (1923).
10 Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n, 381 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1963); University of
Denver-Colorado Seminary v. Johnston, 378 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1963) ; Indus-
trial Comm'n v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962); Watson v.
Merritt, 149 Colo. 562, 369 P.2d 989 (1962); Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co., 146
Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Industrial Comm'n v. Horner, 137 Colo. 368,
325 P.2d 698 (1958) ; Claimants in the Matter of the Death of Bennett v.
Durango Furniture Mart, 136 Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494 (1957); Industrial
Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957).
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the minority rule in requiring overexertion, as opposed to mere ex-
ertion, as a condition to compensability. Compensation has been
granted in cases in which there was no overexertion, but only when
some other extraordinary circumstance, such as abnormal working
conditions,1 or, perhaps, externally produced blows or strains to
the physical structure of the body, 12 existed. This requirement of
something out of the ordinary as a prerequisite to compensability
of heart attack cases is, of course, out of line with the requirements
for compensability of other kinds of injuries in Colorado.13
B. Overexertion
Accepting the requirement of overexertion as the rule in Colo-
rado, we might ask, "What if the sufferer normally overexerted
himself? Is overexertion only work that is unusual by the sufferer's
own standard, or does any work that is unusually heavy by an
objective standard amount to overexertion, whether it be usual or
unusual?" Surprisingly, the court appears regularly to have fol-
lowed the theory that the presence of overexertion is to be deter-
mined by the subjective test. Although it has specifically said this
only once,14 it has consistently based its reasoning on the require-
ment of overexertion as measured by the subjective test.15 In the
only case that might indicate otherwise an externally produced
blow was involved,16 and the court has held that this in itself is
sufficient to establish a presumption that the heart attack arose
out of the employment.
1T
Whether, as a practical matter, the Industrial Commission is
inclined to find the fact of overexertion more easily in cases involv-
ing habitually hard working victims' or whether the court is in-
clined to reverse a commission finding of no overexertion in such
cases cannot be ascertained from the cases. One might suspect that
the nature of the work has some influence in light of the harshness
of the everexertion rule coupled with the subjective test. In fact,
however, in a case that is difficult to reconcile with the general
trend of Colorado cases in more aspects than one, the court reversed
the Industrial Commission's award although the victim of the heart
attack clearly had been involved in an exertion that was unusual
to his employment. In this case, United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
11 Carroll v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921).
12 Cf. Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957).
13 Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm's, 84 Colo. 481, 271 Pac. 617
(1928).
14 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571, 45 P.2d
895 (1935).
15 See Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428
(1962) ; Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co., 146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Claim-
ants in the Matter of the Death of Bennett v. Durango Furniture Mart, 136
Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494 (1957) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111,
314 P.2d 698 (1957); Coors Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, 109 Colo. 39, 121 P.2d
669 (1942); Wood v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Colo. 209, 66 P.2d 806 (1937).
18 See Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698
(1957).
17 Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Horner, 137 Colo. 368, 325 P.2d 698 (1958);
Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962).
18 See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d
296 (1951).
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Industrial Comm'n, 9 the claimant, driver and guide of a tourist
agency's car, was the victim of a mechanical breakdown on Look-
out Mountain. The car caught fire, which the claimant quickly put
out with sand he scooped from the mountainside. After finding a
telephone, telephoning twice to his office for a replacement car,
and waiting several hours, he suffered a non-fatal heart attack.
Although the court reversed the Commission's award because the
claimant's medical evidence as to whether the accident arose out
of the employment was couched in terms of possibilities, the case
is still difficult to reconcile with the trend of Colorado cases. Per-
haps the statement that the court applies a subjective test of over-
exertion must be modified to the extent that while the court will
not use an objective test in favor of a heart attack victim, it will
do so to the detriment of the victim.
If this conclusion is correct, the United States Fid. & Guar. Co.
case is clearly out of line with the general philosophy of compensa-
tion cases, which the court has thus expressed: "[The Workmen's
Compensation Act] is highly remedial in its purpose and must be
given a liberal construction to accomplish its beneficial purposes."20
It might be well to reiterate that the requirement of overexertion
itself, besides being the minority rule2' and inconsistent with the
philosophy cited above, is inconsistent with the Colorado rule in
cases involving other types of injuries that "to constitute an acci-
dental injury, it is not necessary that there should be anything ex-
traordinary occurring in or about the work itself .... "22
In reference to the possibilty of distinguishing the United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. case on any basis other than the one used, it might
be well to point out that the fatal or nonfatal nature of the Colo-
rado cases has never altered the applicability of the law involved.
Neither, for that matter, has the particular medical nature of the
heart attack, except insofar as the question of causation is involved,
i.e., whether the particular type of heart attack in question is likely
to have been due to the employment.
23
Our consideration has indicated that if overexertion, abnormal
working conditions, or any externally produced blow to or strain
in the physical structure of the body (other than the heart attack
itself) is present, the accident will be deemed to have arisen out of
the employment, barring the existeace of such complicating ques-
tions as whether the victim recovered from the extraordinary cir-
cumstance before the alleged accident, or whether there was an
19 122 Colo. 31, 219 P.2d 315 (1950).
20 Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 119, 314 P.2d 698, 702 (1957).
21 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.30 (rev. ed.
1962).
22 Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo. 481, 490, 271 Pac.
617,621 (1928).
23 See Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n. of Colo., 381 P.2d 253 (1963); Huff v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Marrote v. State Com-
pensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99, 357 P.2d 915 (1961); Industrial Comm'n
of Colo. v. Daniels, 124 Colo. 329, 236 P.2d 291 (1951) ; Peter Kiewit Sons'
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d 296 (1951); Black
Forest Fox Ranch v. Garrett, 110 Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (1943); Coors
Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, 109 Colo. 39, 121 P.2d 669 (1942) ; Industrial
Comm'n v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937).
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intervening cause. Of what, then, does overexertion, abnormal
working condition, or blow or strain consist?
These being questions of fact,24 and determined by the Commis-
sion according to the singularities of each case, it is impossible
to delineate accurately the conditions that will satisfy the Commis-
sion or the court. Of course, any exertion that is unusual to the
victim's work should meet the test for overexertion.2 5 But the diffi-
culty of foreseeing the result of litigation revolving around this
problem can be easily understood through a comparison of two
24 Ellerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Colo. 20, 213 Pac. 120 (1923).
25 United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571, 45
P.2d 895 (1935).
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cases. In Industrial Comm'n. v. Wetz, 26 in which the decedent, a
city garage mechanic, incurred his heart attack on an unusually
cold morning, apparently while attempting to start a truck by
cranking its engine, the state supreme court reversed the Commis-
sion to find overexertion as a matter of law. Yet, in Industrial
Comm'n. v. Hesler,27 in which the decedent, a highway worker, died
of a coronary thrombosis after having considerable difficulty start-
ing a road grader on a very cold morning, the court affirmed the
Commission's denial of an award because "starting the road grader,
even on cold mornings, was a 'normal part of the decedent's
duties.' "28 In both cases there was evidence of a prior heart condi-
tion. There was no indication in the Wetz case that starting cold
motors had been anything but normal to the decedent's duties, but
the Hesler court did not attempt to distinguish the two cases.
In the highly publicized case of University of Denver, Colo.
Seminary v. Johnston,29 the supreme court was able to avoid the
very difficult question of whether overexertion could be found in
the case of a hard-working law school dean who suffered a heart
attack while making a public address after several days of extra-
ordinarily strenuous activities by finding 'that the speech was not
in the course of employment.
III. "AcCIDENT" AND "INJURY" DEFINED BY STATUTE.
By defining the terms "accident" and "injury," the Colorado
Legislature has put into some doubt the status of heart attacks as
industrial accidents. Whether the overexertion rule and the sub-
jective test will continue to be the Colorado approach depends upon
the manner in which the courts construe the new statute. To shed
some light on the question the new statute will be discussed first
in a general sense (non-heart attack cases) examining the construc-
tion of similar statutes in other jurisdictions and then as applied to
heart attack cases. The authors hope this approach will not only
illustrate the alternative interpretations that have been used but
that it will aid the courts in construing the new Colorado statute.
A. "Accident" in Other Jurisdictions
The requirement that an injury be accidental in nature to merit
workmen's compensation has been adopted either legislatively or
judicially by all but four states: California, Iowa, Massachusetts
and Rhode Island." The Federal Employers Compensation Act
omits the requirement.
1
The Colorado act includes the accidental prerequisite in the
section which sets forth the conditions precedent to recovery:
The right to compensation provided for in this chapter, .. .
shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:
(3) Where the injury or death is proximately caused by
26100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937).
27 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428, 431 (1962).
28 Id. at 600, 370 P.2d at 431.
29 151 Colo. 465, 378 P.2d 830 (1963).
30 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 37.10 (rev. ed. 1962).
315 U.S.C. § 751 (Supp. Pamph. 1951-1961).
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accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and
is not intentionally self inflicted.
32
It appears that the legislature, in adopting the 1963 amendment,
deemed it necessary to modify the judicial construction that has
been placed upon the terms "accident" and "injury" by the Supreme
Court of Colorado. This brings us to the basic philosophical conflict
among the jurisdictions which have adopted the "accident" require-
ment. The principal difference in application has been whether the
sine qua non of compensation was that the cause of injury be acci-
dental or that the result be so. Colorado clearly followed the
accidental result theory until the new definition was adopted in
1963.
33
Two indispensable ingredients are found in the usual work-
men's compensation statute - unexpectedness and a definiteness
of time, place, or cause. Professor Larson breaksdown the potential








If both parts of both elements are present, we have the typical in-
dustrial accident; if all the elements are missing, we find the
typical occupational disease, the cause being the characteristic
harmful condition of the particular industry.34 The voluminous
litigation in the area results from the absence of one or more of the
component parts. Prior to the enactment of the 1963 Amendment,
the Supreme Court of Colorado allowed compensation in non-heart
attack cases upon the showing of an accidental result, that is, the
unexpected consequence of routine exertion arising out of and in
the course of employment.
A case in point, Wesco Elec. Co. v. Shook, 5 is worthy of ex-
amination, particularly as it may have been a factor in the accident
amendment of the Colorado statute. An electrician, in previous good
health, suffered severe pain in his back and loss of full use of a leg
when he was required to assume an unnatural position in perform-
ing his assigned work for a period of several days. The disability
subsequently was described as a herniation of an intervertebral
disc. The court reversed the denial of compensation, holding that
the electrician suffered an accident. In effect, the unexpected result
itself was the accident. Whether the same ruling would obtain under
the present statute depends upon the judical construction placed
upon the statutory language.
Colorado is the eighth state to provide a statutory definition
of the term "accident." The other seven states are Alabama, 3
32 COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-13-2 (1953).
3 Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo. 481, 271 Pac. 617
(1928).
34 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 37.20 (rev. ed. 1962).
35 143 Colo. 382, 353 P.2d 743 (1960).3 6 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262(i) (1958).
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Florida, 7 Idaho,38 Louisiana,39 Missouri, 40 Nebraska,4
1 and Nevada. 42
All but Colorado have included in their definition of "accident" the
language "an unexpected or unforseen event happening suddenly"
or words of similar import. Four states, Alabama, Missouri, Ne-
braska, and Nevada, require that the event must occur "suddenly
and violently." Florida and Idaho require only that event occur"suddenly." Louisiana employs the language "suddenly or violently."
None of them have utilized language in any way identical to that
of Colorado: "One or more determinate act or acts of a traumatic
nature, which caused an injury.
43
Examination of cases in these seven jurisdictions indicates that
Florida and Idaho adhere to the accidental result theory, while the
others require the showing of an accidental cause. The Florida
court, allowing recovery to a cook who injured her arm while
lifting a can of waffle batter, stated:
It is the unexpected and unintentional effect of the strain
or exertion that is covered by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law as an injury "by accident," and a literal showing
of an "accident" such as a slip, fall or misstep is not a pre-
requisite to recovery."
Similarly, the Idaho statute, which states:
"Accident" as used in this law, means an unexpected unde-
signed, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening
suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs,
and which can be definitely located as to time when and place
where it occurred, causing an injury, as defined in this law,45
has been construed as requiring only an accidental result. The Idaho
court has said: "nothing more is required than that the harm that
plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected. It is enough that causes
themselves known and usual, should produce a result which on a
particular occasion is neither designed nor expected. '46 In another
case, the same court held: "an 'accident' occurs in doing what the
workman habitually does if any unexpected, undesigned, unlooked-
for or untoward event or mishap, connected with or growing out of
the employment, takes place.
47
These decisions are clearly in accord with the philosophy under-
lying the Shook case, discussed earlier, but we submit that such
result must be contra to the legislative purpose in enacting Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 82-2-9. Had the legislature intended that the Colorado
court continue to follow the accidental result theory, it would have
had no reason to amend the act.
37 FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (19) (1959).
38 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201 (1949).
39 LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1021 (1) (1951).
40 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020 (2) (Supp. 1960).
41 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151 (2) (Reissue 1960).
42 NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.020 (Supp. 1959).
43 COLO. REv. STAT. § 51-2-9, 91O. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 180, § 1.
44 Gray v. Employers Mut. L'ab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 1953).
45 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-20/ (1949).
46 Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87 (1926).
47 Laird v. State Highway Dept., 80 Idaho 12, 323 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1958).
VOL. -XLI
A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
B. The Legislative Intent
This brings us to the question of just what the legislature did
have in mind when it enacted the new provision. Unfortunately, no
records are retained of the legislative debate concerning the legisla-
tion in Colorado. Although individual members of the legislature
are willing to discuss their private understanding of the meaning
of a statute, they are not competent to offer legally relevant testi-
mony as to the intent of the legislature.
Perhaps some indication of the intent of the legislature may be
gained by comparing the draft of Senate Bill No. 255 as originally
introduced with the form of the bill ultimately enacted. The pro-
bative value of this "before and after" approach is dubious, but
courts frequently make use of such comparisons to ascertain the
intent of the legislature.
The proposed form of COLO. REV. STAT. 81-2-8 (1) contained the
language "a single or determinate act," which was amended to read
''one or more determinate act or acts." This revision may have been
in recognition of the fact that some injuries are the cumulative
result of repetitious causes, no one of which could have caused the
injury by itself. The Supreme Court of Idaho expressed itself on
that subject by stating: "The accident, need not occur at one in-
stant, but . . . there may be repetitious causes all relatively slight
which culminate and result in as serious and fatal an injury as
though the disabling or lethal blow or incident occurred at one
time."
48
On the other hand, this "straw that broke the camel's back"
proposition has been considered and flatly rejected by the Washing-
ton court, which held: "Cumulative effect, however injurious, is
noncompensable unless it constitutes industrial disease.
'49
The phrase, "of a sudden, tangible, and traumatic nature," in
the proposed bill was amended to "of a traumatic nature." Whether
the words "sudden" and "tangible" were deleted because they were
considered redundant or because the legislature considered the pos-
sibility of compensating an intangible trauma of some sort remains
to be seen. At the least, the door appears to be open for cases of
"emotional trauma," which we shall discuss later.
The construction to be placed upon the words "of a traumatic
nature" will be of the greatest importance in the determination of
the compensability of future cases. The state of Washington, al-
though not providing a statutory definition of "accident," has de-
fined the term "injury" as: "a sudden and tangible happening, of
a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and
occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result
therefrom." 50 The Washington court has held that the word "trau-
matic" means " 'of or pertaining to trauma' " while "trauma" is
defined as "'any injury to the body caused by violence.'-51 In a
subsequent case, involving the meaning of the entire phrase, the
48 Brown v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 60 Idaho 49, 87 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1938).
49 Haerling v. Department of Labor and Industries, 27 Wash. 2d 403, 301 P.2d
1078, 1080 (1956).
5 o WASH. REv. CODE, § 51.08.100 (1961).
51 Metcalf v. Department of Labor and Industries, 168 Wash. 350, 11 P.2d
821,823 (1932).
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same court held that sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic
nature, means that there must be a definite and particular happen-
ing, which can be fixed at point of time, to which injury can be
attributed.
5 2
Washington does not, however, require that the violence must
emanate from an external source entirely. Thus an employee's death
from a cerebral hemorrhage, caused by the bursting of a blood
vessel as the result of hardened arteries and overexertion in sawing
a log to clear a road, was compensable within the statutory defini-
tion. The court likened the cerebral hemorrhage to a dislocated
shoulder, torn tejAdon, or sprained wrist. 53
The Washington court has also allowed compensation for heart
conditions. The elements which must be established in order to
connect death or disability from a heart condition with the employ-
ment of a decedent or claimant are an acute heart condition with
death or disability resulting therefrom, and a shock or exertion,
either great or slight, occurring in the course of employment, by
which the heart was subjected to strain beyond its capacity to with-
stand.
54
Otl~er jurisdictions have considered the legal definition of
"trauma." The North Carolina court defined "trauma" as "injury to
the body inflicted by some form of outside force and divided into
four categories: (1) Physical trauma: caused by physical violence;
(2) Thermal trauma: caused by heat or cold; (3) Electrical trauma:
caused by electrical energy; (4) Chemical trauma: caused by
poisons,"55 while the Ohio court has stated that "the medical trauma
... is not such trauma as is contemplated by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law.
56
We feel that it may be significant that the legislature amended
the proposed language of COLO. REV. STAT. 81-2-9 (2), which read:
"The term 'injury' or 'injuries' as used in this chapter shall mean
and include only physical violence to the physical structure of the
body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom."
(Emphasis supplied). "Physical violence" was deleted and the
52 Higgins v. Department of Labor and Indus., 27 Wash. 2d 816, 180 P.2d
559 (1947).
53 Ibid.
54 Cyr v. Department of Labor and Indus., 47 Wash. 2d 92, 286 P.2d 1038
(1955).
55 Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66 S.E.2d 693 (1951).
56 Burns v. Employers Liab. Ass'n, 31 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938).
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word "trauma" substituted, raising the inference that the word
"trauma" was to be given a broad construction. The proposed form
of the same section continued: "The terms shall be construed to
include disability or death due to emotional trauma, traumatic
neurosis, or natural causes occurring while the employee is at work."
In the final form, "emotional trauma" and "traumatic neurosis"
were deleted and "occupational diseases" added, so that only death
due to natural causes and occupational diseases are not to be con-
strued as "injuries." In our opinion, therefore, both emotional
trauma and traumatic neurosis may be held to be "injuries" com-
pensable within the meaning of the statute, assuming that a causal
relationship can be shown. The two concepts may be distinguished
if we consider emotional trauma as mental stimulation causing a
nervous injury, and a traumatic neurosis as a physical trauma caus-
ing a nervous injury. Thus, a traumatic neurosis may increase or
extend a claimant's disability following an accident; the neurosis
itself is compensable.57 Since an emotional trauma lacks initial
physical contact it might be more difficult to reconcile with the act.
But as we mentioned in the discussion of the deletion of the word
"tangible," it may have been the intent of the legislature to allow
compensation for emotional trauma. Thus, where injury is sustained
as the result of fright or excitement, resulting in hysterical paralysis
or blindness, a claim for compensation would be well worth pur-
suing.
5
All of the above mentioned amendments were made by the
Committee on Labor between February 19, 1963, and March 21,
1963. 59 It is unfortunate that no records were maintained of the
legislative debate concerning them.
C. Accidental Cause - The New Colorado Rule
In our opinion, it is certiin that Colorado will no longer be
able to follow the accidental result theory. Therefore we shall
examine some of the cases in accidental cause theory jurisdictions.
Missouri appears to be typical.
The Missouri statute defines the term "accident" as follows:
"The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean
an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and vio-
lently, with or without human fault and producing at the same time
objective symptoms of an injury." 0 In 1932 the Missouri court con-
strued the word "event" as synonymous with "occurrenr," includ-
ing all of the steps or connected incidents from the first cause to
the final result, and stated that an event may include both cause
and effect.61 The same court in 1942 held that:
57 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 42.21-42.24 (rev. ed.
1962).
58 But see Classen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 387 P.2d 264 (Colo.
1963). A Texas court has interpreted a statute defining injury as damage
to the physical structure of the body as allowing recovery for emotional
trauma. See Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d
315 (1955).
59 Senate Journal, Forty-fourth General Assembly, First Regular Session,
State of Colorado, 1963 pp. 272 and 562-563.
80 MO. STAT. ANN. § 287.020 (2) (Supp. 1960).
81 Rinehart v. F. M. Stamper Co., 27 Mo. App. 653, 55 S.W.2d 729 (1932).
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S.. [T] he injury itself does not constitute the "event" or
"accident" . . . [within this section.] [W]here the em-
ployee's injury results from his exertion of force in lifting
or pulling upon some inanimate object, there must be some
unusual occurrence, such as a slip, or fall, or abnormal
strain, in order to bring the case within the contemplation
of the act [citations omitted] .62
Similar language was used in another case: "Injury ... due to nec-
essary and customary physical exertion incident to the normal du-
ties of the workmen ... is not an 'accident' within the Workmen's
Compensation Law. '63 The death of an employee caused by over-
exertion in the course of his employment, however, is an "accident"
compensable under the Missouri act.6 4 We feel that "event" may
be deemed synonymous with "act or acts" in the Colorado statute.
The word "suddenly" as used in defining an accident has been
held not to mean "instantaneous," so that an "accident" may consist
of a single occurrence or a series of occurrences resulting in an in-
jury.6 5 As discussed above, in our opinion the same should hold true
in Colorado.
Although the Missouri court has consistently denied compensa-
tion for injuries arising in the normal course of employment, when
an injury is sustained as the result of an unexpected and abnormal
strain while the injured employee is engaged in doing something be-
yond and different from his normal routine, and not as a result of
orderly natural causes, an "accident" results within the meaning of
the act and is compensable. This has been true even though the
force which caused the abnormal strain emanated entirely from
physical exertion by the injured employee and not from sources ex-
ternal to his body and was not accompanied by any slip or fall.
66
This distinction is apparent in the Missouri hernia cases. Com-
pensation was denied to a workman who suffered a hernia while
lifting an oil barrel in the normal manner,6T and to a ditch digger
who was throwing a shovel of mud in the usual manner, without
slipping or falling,68 but was allowed to a workman who received his
hernia while removing a lug on an auto tire by an unusual method.6 9
It appears from a perusal of the cases in the accidental cause
jurisdictions that any deviation in the normal work routine or any
abnormal strain or exertion will be sufficient to show an "accident."
The tendency appears to be to award compensation where there is
the slightest justification, but it is absolutely mandatory in the acci-
dental cause jurisdictions that the justification be shown. We expect
this to be the rule in future Colorado cases as well.
Although this construction makes recovery by an injured em-
62 Kendrick v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 166 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
63 Smith v. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body, St. Louis Division, 189 S.W.2d
259, 263, 264 (Mo. 1945).
64 Delille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834 (1933).
65 Vogt v. Ford Motor Co., 138 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
66 Williams v. Anderson Air Activities, 319 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
67 Higbee v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 191 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
68 Keller v. Bechtel, McCone, Parsons Corp., 174 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App.
1943).




ployee more difficult and appears to work to the benefit of the em-
ployer, it may have unusual results where the injury is proximately
caused by the employer's negligence. A 1960 Nevada decision7 0 pre-
sents a case in point.
The Nevada act provides: "'Accident' shall be construed to
mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and
violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury."71
The plaintiff, who sought to avoid the exclusive remedy of the
act, was employed in a printing shop which was left unheated dur-
ing an unseasonably cold period. She became chilled, suffered se-
vere chest pains, was treated by her doctor and hospitalized. Subse-
quently, she was treated for pleurisy, then ideopathic pericarditis,
and then for systemic lupus erythemotosis. Medical testimony was
received that her being subjected to the cold while at work had trig-
gered the disease's process. As she was unable to work as steadily
as before she became ill, her earnings were reduced from $100.00 to
$35.00 per week.
The employer relied upon a medical parallel: an injured em-
ployee had developed systemic lupus erythemotosis following ex-
posure to the sun, which can also trigger the disease, and had been
awarded compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
er's Compensation Act.
7 2
The Nevada court rejected this precedent. It found that the
federal act did not require the same standard of proof of an "acci-
dent" as did Nevada, and that the facts in the case did not constitute
an accident within the meaning of the Nevada act, lacking the ele-
ments of "suddenly and violently." Nor was the plaintiff's illness an
occupational disease, as members of the general public were as like-
ly to contract the disease as the plaintiff. Therefore, the disease was
not compensable under the act and the plaintiff had the right to pur-
sue a common law remedy against the employer. The court then
obligingly found that the evidence disclosed that the employer had
violated two sections of the Nevada safety code, requiring the em-
ployer to provide a safe place to work and not to permit the em-
ployee to work in an unsafe place, violation of which constituted
negligence per se.73 It thus appears that an act that is susceptible to
too narrow a construction might well fail to provide as much pro-
tection to the employer as the legislature intended.
D. The New Act and Heart Attack Cases
The amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act enacted
in 1963 were initiated primarily by the Denver Chamber of Com-
merce and Colorado employers who insure themselves.74 Republi-
70 Smith v. Garside, 76 Nev. 378, 355 P.2d 849 (1960).
71 NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.020 (Supp. 1959).
72 Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Willard, 99 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
The Act is 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1957).
73 Compare Jacobson v. Doan, 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957) where the
Supreme Court of Colorado made a similar determination in a case involv-
ing a loaned employee.
74 Interview with Harold Clark Thompson, counsel for the State Compensa-:
tion Insurance Fund and secretary-treasurer of the American Association
of State Compensation Insurance Funds.
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can and Democratic legislators and others who worked on the bill,
both in committee and on the floor, agree that the amendments,
Senate Bill 255, were sponsored by Republican members of the legis-
lature with the general intent of "tightening up" the requirements
for compensability. 75 The bill contained other provisions, but one of
the most controversial, and the one most opposed by union lobbyists,
was the redefinition of "accident" and "injury" or "injuries.
76
Despite an attempt by members of the state senate's labor com-
mittee to kill the bill, it was brought to the floor of the senate and
passed, albeit amidst considerable turmoil. After debate, an amend-
ed bill was passed by both houses in an atmosphere of bipartisan-
ship.
House member William Myrick, a Republican, led the opposi-
tion to the bill, and introduced the words pertaining to "trauma" in
the redefinitions of both "accident" and "injury." His intent was to
leave such injuries as heart attacks "'compensable to the same extent
they were without the redefinitions."
77
Others are not so certain of the result of the redefinitions. They
think the supreme court conceivably may find that the new terms
either rule out compensability of heart attacks entirely, or make any
heart attack compensable, whether or not it was induced by overex-
ertion.
78
The new definition, by equating "accident" with one or more
determinate traumatic acts causing an injury, could be read to in-
clude heart attacks caused by overexertion if overexertion is viewed
as a trauma definite as to time and space. Ordinary exertion, how-
ever, is a priori untraceable to a specific event and could never be
''one or more acts of a traumatic nature" unless the word "trauma"
is open to judicial redefinition. Referees of the Industrial Commis-
sion will treat future heart attack cases just as they have treated
past ones, unless and until the supreme court tells them to do other-
wise.79 While the Commission thinks the legislators intended to
change the result of some heart attack cases, it does not think the
words adopted in the bill will carry out that purpose.80
In contrast to the Commission's opinion of legislative intent,
however, at least one Republican proponent of the bill states that
the redefinitions, as finally approved, were neither intended to af-
fect the compensability of heart attacks, nor will they have that re-
sult, except, possibly, in "unforeseeable and exceptional cases."8'
75 Interview with State Senator Joseph B. Schieffelin, Republican, in Decem-
ber, 1963; interview with Representative Ted Rubin, Democrat, in Decem-
ber, 1963.
76 Colo. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 180, §1.
77 Interview with Representative William Myrick, Republican, in December,
1963.
78 Booklet, News and Exhibits of The American Association of State Com-
pensation Insurance Funds, by Harold Clark Thompson, Secretary-Treas-
urer, July 1, 1963.
79 Interview with James H. Murphy, Referee of the Colorado Industrial Com-
mission, December 1963.
80 Ibid.





Upon a careful consideration of the new Colorado enactment, in
light of prior heart attack cases and cases from other jurisdictions
involving non-heart attack "injuries," one becomes painfully aware
that the Colorado legislators may be on the wrong track. If the leg-
islative intent was to decrease the range of compensation for heart
attacks, such purpose may not have been accomplished by defining
"accident" and "injury." Furthermore, a more rational approach to
heart attack cases could easily be accomplished by a statute dealing
specifically with this type of injury, as the legislature has done for
hernias.
8 2
If the legislative intent, on the other hand, was to "tighten up"
the requirements of the act8 3 the new provisions may have gone too
far. By requiring traumatic acts of a determinate nature (accidental
cause) and eliminating from the concept of "injury" natural causes,
the new amendment creates an aura of doubt in cases which were
formerly compensable as a matter of routine. For example, the fol-
lowing types of cases were usually compensated prior to the amend-
ment-are they no longer compensable?: (1) traumatic neurosis, in-
cluding "compensation neurosis; 8s 4 (2) injuries due to sunstroke,
heat exhaustion, frostbite and freezing; 85 (3) injuries due to being
struck by lightning; 86 (4) injuries due to bacterial infection con-
tracted by, e.g., hospital employees peculiarly exposed.
The new amendments, as can be easily seen, do more than
"tighten up"; they remove from consideration by the Industrial
Commission whole areas of cases previously compensated. The leg-
islature probably did not consider whether this would open up the
area of tort suits against employers 87 which, of course, is one possi-
bility resulting from removal of certain types of cases from the act.
More likely than not, however, the injuries defined out of the act by
the new amendment will go uncompensated. This result, unfortu-
nately, flies in the face of trends toward increasing the scope of
workmen's compensation coverage thereby spreading the risk of oc-
cupational injury instead of letting the loss lie where it may fall.
A final observation is in point. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
at this writing, has not passed upon the new provisions, although
several cases are pending. In addition there is a strong movement to
repeal or re-amend the provisions in question as soon as the Janu-
ary 1965 legislature convenes. If this is so, the court may refrain
from interpreting the act until the legisature has acted. If the court
does consider the cases, however, we submit the language in other
jurisdictions interpreting similar phrases will be very persuasive
precedent.
82 CoLO. REv. STAT. § 81-12-11 (1953).
83 See note 28 supra.
84 Arvas v. McNeil Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949) ; National Lum-
ber Creosoting Co. v. Kelly, 101 Colo. 535, 75 P.2d 144 (1937).
85 Gates v. Central City Opera House Ass'n, 107 Colo. 93, 108 P.2d 880 (1940).
Compare Wood v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Colo. 209, 66 P.2d 806 (1937).
86 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927).
87 See notes 73 and 76 supra.
